A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of Bilateral Agreements in Resolving Disputes Between Sovereigns Arising from Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law: The Australian Agreement by King, James W.
NOTES
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICACY OF
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN RESOLVING DISPUTES
BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS ARISING FROM EXTRATER-
RITORIAL APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW: THE
AUSTRALIAN AGREEMENT
I. BACKGROUND
The application of United States antitrust law to conduct en-
gaged in by individuals and firms outside United States borders'
frequently constitutes the source of international antitrust con-
flict.2 The exportation of United States antitrust law, both direct'
and indirect," is perceived by the recipient national sovereign as an
intrusion adversely affecting its ability to control and direct na-
' As early as 1945, United States courts espoused the principle of "settled law ... that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders, that has consequences within its borders, which the state reprehends
. . . ." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945). The
strict standards of United States antitrust law declare illegal "every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis
added). United States antitrust enforcement agencies have reaffirmed their commitment to
the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law by stating that no essential
distinction is made between domestic and foreign firms concerning antitrust enforcement in
the United States. See generally ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE]; Bell, International Comity and the Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust Laws, 51 AUSTL. L.J. 801 (1977).
' See, e.g., Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the
United States: A View From Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978). The author ob-
serves that the "use of extraterritorial antitrust investigation, far from preventing diplo-
matic controversy and confrontation, tends to exacerbate these problems and to draw the
legislature and judiciary into the fray as well." Id. at 201.
' United States antitrust officials have participated extensively in the formulation of anti-
trust legislation and policy of the European Economic Communities, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and Australia. King, International Operations: Current Antitrust Environ-
ment, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 452, 465 (1976). See also infra note 12.
" See generally ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1; Timberg, An International Antitrust
Convention: A Proposal to Harmonize Conflicting National Policies Towards the Multina-
tional Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157 (1973); Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between
Friends: Canada and the United States in the Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165
(1978); Stanford, supra note 2, at 201.
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tional economic policy effectively and, in many instances, to ex-
ploit and market natural resources adequately. 5 The gravity of the
purported effect of antitrust extraterritoriality on foreign national
sovereignty6 invites a brief examination of United States justifica-
tion for its antitrust enforcement policy.7
The basic economic principle of free market competition, with
its attendant advantages to the small-to-medium size business as
well as to the consumer in the form of higher quality goods and
lower prices, constitutes a cornerstone of United States business
regulation and economic policy.' In view of the proliferation on an
' Stanford, supra note 2, at 204-06, maintains that the threat to foreign companies of
United States antitrust liability is a strong disincentive to compliance with national eco-
nomic policies, thereby undermining national control over resource and industrial
development.
' For a detailed discussion of these effects and the consequent international hostility
thereto, see infra text accompanying notes 18-45.
" Although this Note examines primarily the effect of antitrust extraterritoriality on the
sovereignty of foreign nations, it is essential to realize that the issue actually involves the
broad question of extraterritorial jurisdiction not confined to the application of antitrust
laws. Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter has stated that:
(C]ontroversies with our trading partners and allies that have been said to stem
from the extension of U.S. law into the sphere of international commerce and
trade do not derive exclusively or even primarily from the application of the anti-
trust laws to international transactions. Other United States laws have been iden-
tified as posing serious or immediate problems for United States business and also
for our trading partners. A representative sampling. . . would include the Export
Administration Act's general export control provisions and anti-boycott regula-
tions, the Ribicoff tax amendments of 1976, the Trading with the Enemy Act,
CFTC regulation and enforcement actions. .. and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.
Commission on the International Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws Act: Hearings on
S. 432 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on S. 432]. For an illustrative sampling of foreign government reaction to con-
troversial non-antitrust situations involving the extraterritorial application of United States
laws, see id. at 53-55 (statement of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State). But
cf. id. at 58 (views expressed by Kingman Brewster regarding the propriety of establishing a
Commission to study the international application of antitrust laws). Arguing that the scope
of the Commission's mandate should be restricted to the study of antitrust extraterritorial-
ity, Brewster maintains serious doubts concerning the "usefulness of bundling together the
study of laws which reflect quite disparate national interests and policies .... The conflict-
ing interests of other States [as well as the priority urged by domestic national interests]
which must be dealt with will also be quite different in the case of export control or an-
tiboycott legislation than they will be in antitrust." Id. Brewster concludes that any attempt
to formulate a single jurisdictional rule to encompass all aspects of extraterritoriality would
be illusory. Id.
8 See Marks, State Department Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J.
INT'L L. & EcON. 153, 154 (1978); Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 88-89, 153. In a
diplomatic exchange concerning the enactment of British blocking legislation, the United
States underscored the importance of United States antitrust law by stating that "United
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international level of the business activity conducted by multina-
tional enterprises, the extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust law is seen as a prerequisite to effective regulation of the
United States market in accordance with this pro-competitive eco-
nomic philosophy.9 In addition to the proposition that effective
regulation of the market mandates extraterritorial supervision, ad-
vocates of antitrust extraterritoriality maintain that the export of
United States antitrust law brings to the international field the
much-needed concepts of fairness and due process. 10
Although the relative merits of this antitrust export policy are
debatable, it is beyond dispute that during the past four decades,
the United States has had ample opportunity to vigorously prose-
lytize the anti-cartel, 1 pro-competition religion. 2 The problems
raised by the export of this anti-cartel philosophy become particu-
larly acute when viewed in the context of increasing resort to the
States antitrust law reflects a public policy so important to the United States that violations
carry criminal penalties." United States Diplomatic Note concerning the U.K. Protection of
Trading Interests Bill, No. 56 (Nov. 9, 1979), 21 I.L.M. 840, 843 (1982).
1 See generally ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1; Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 103.
In addition to the comprehensive federal antitrust regulatory scheme which enables the
United States to exercise effective control over the consequences of multinational enterprise
conduct to the United States economy, the scope of domestic long-arm statutes (providing
courts in the United States with jurisdiction to regulate business conduct) facilitates regula-
tion of the multinational corporation. The willingness of United States courts to pierce the
veil of corporate identity in order to secure effective relief for injury caused by anti-competi-
tive corporate conduct further supports United States supervision of corporate conduct
abroad. Davidow, Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law in a Chang-
ing World, 8 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 895, 900 (1976).
" Davidow, supra note 9, at 895. The Supreme Court has characterized United States
antitrust doctrine asia "charter of economic liberty". Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
" Members of a cartel typically raise the price of commodity goods above the long-run
competitive equilibrium level by collectively agreeing to restrict the production level of that
good. See Weintraub, The Example of OPEC and the Possibility of Other Producer Car-
tels, 24 Am. U.L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1975).
"' See supra notes 3-4. See also Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of
the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 271 (1978), where the authors describe decarte-
lization and the dissemination of United States antitrust law as United States goals during
the post-war industrial restructuring of Germany and Japan. The United States has been a
party to several international antitrust agreements, including three recommendations of the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Council, a decision under
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and two bilateral agreements. See
infra notes 75-98 and accompanying text. For citations to these various international agree-
ments, see Antitrust Law: United Nations Guidelines, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 405, 411 n. 35
(1981). Also, the United States sent antitrust experts to help in drafting the Havana Charter
of 1948 and to participate in the 1952 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Ad Hoc
Committee. Davidow & Chiles, supra, at 271.
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device of international cartelization by basic commodity-producing
nations."3 It is against this scenario of prevalent foreign govern-
ment involvement in international cartels" coupled with intense
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement by the United States that
the specter of United States interference with foreign national sov-
ereignty emerges. 15
II. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1982, the United States and Australia reached an
agreement providing for cooperation on antitrust matters. 16 The
agreement is designed to establish a bilateral framework for resolv-
ing antitrust law conflicts in a manner which would preclude im-
pairment of national sovereignty and respect traditional considera-
tions of comity.' 7 The objective of this Note is to assess the efficacy
of the agreement in attenuating the Australian perception that the
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law has re-
sulted in the infringement of national sovereignty. The Note exam-
ines the foreign and domestic objections advanced against United
States antitrust extraterritoriality. The legislative attempts by for-
eign nations to circumvent the extraterritorial enforcement of fed-
eral antitrust law and the significant costs to the United States of
13 Bergsten, Resource Scarcity: Cartelization and Contrived Shortages, 24 AM. U.L. REV.
1128, 1128 (1975); Cira, Current Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Law, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157, 160 (1978); Note, The Applicability of the
Antitrust Laws to International Cartels Involving Foreign Governments, 91 YALE L.J. 765,
765 n. 1 (1982). A 1974 study undertaken by the OECD concludes that nearly six hundred
export cartels of some type were operating in the United States and Europe. ORGANIZATION
OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE Busi-
NESS PRACTICES, EXPORT CARTELS (1974).
"I Foreign government participation in a cartel is achieved in three ways: a) direct partici-
pation by the central foreign government; b) direct participation by an instrumentality of
the central foreign government; or c) authorization or mandate by the central foreign gov-
ernment that a private producer become a cartel member. Note, supra note 13, at 765 n. 2.
A peculiar problem arises when a private United States entity solicits foreign government
authorization to implement a cartel in order to obtain effective antitrust immunity under
the sovereign compulsion defense. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for an
analysis of this defense and for a suggestion that the United States-Australia Antitrust
Agreement, infra note 16, would allow such a defense in this circumstance.
"' Former United States Senator Jacob Javits recently stated that United States antitrust
extraterritoriality and international cartelization are the "Scylla and Charybdis which [the
United States] must steer between .... " Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 19.
" Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, 21 I.L.M. 702 [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Agreement].
17 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Comment to United States-Australia Antitrust Agreement
(press release June 29, 1982) (copy available in Georgia Journal of International and Com-
parative Law Offices) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Agreement Press Release].
1983] U.S.-AUSTRALIA ANTITRUST AGREEMENT
these foreign legislative efforts are assessed briefly. After describ-
ing the principal provisions of the United States-Australia anti-
trust agreement, the Note then discusses two earlier bilateral
United States antitrust cooperation agreements in an effort to pro-
vide a context against which the success of the Australian agree-
ment might be gauged. Various provisions in the agreement are ex-
amined with reference to whether Australian sovereignty will be
enhanced appreciably by virtue of their inclusion in the agreement.
These provisions relate to Australian export activity, information
use restrictions, United States governmental participation in pri-
vate antitrust suits against Australian firms, a clearance mecha-
nism whereby Australian firms seek antitrust immunity for pro-
posed private conduct, and the escape clause of the agreement.
Finally, this Note questions whether these provisions will indeed
operate to assure Australia of a greater degree of sovereign control
over its domestic business and economic activity.
A. Foreign and Domestic Objection to United States Antitrust
Extraterritoriality
The extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law
has engendered both foreign' s and domestic's opposition. In addi-
IS See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of specific aspects of
United States antitrust law inciting foreign legislative responses; see also United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) (complaints expressed by the United Kingdom); United States v. Watch-
makers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (1965) (complaints expressed by
Switzerland).
For British criticism of the United States effort to "mould the international economic and
trading world into its own image," see 404 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 555 (1980), cited in
Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality
and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. Rzv. 213, 236 n. 127 (1982).
Canadian objections to United States extraterritorial application of the antitrust law are
grounded on the notion that Canadian firms should not be instrumentalities of United
States economic policy. TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, CANADIAN
PIvv COUNCIL OFFICE, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY
(1968), cited in Note, supra, at 256 n. 255. For a succinct review of Australian opposition to
United States antitrust extraterritoriality, see Note, supra, at 244-53.
' Domestic opponents view the policy of United States extraterritorial antitrust jurisdic-
tion as short-sighted and legally indefensible. Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic
Sanctions: The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REv.
323, 324 (1981). Arguments have been proposed which imply that United States interference
with foreign government cartels could thwart the economic development scheme of a foreign
nation so as to endanger any eventual advantages to United States exporters accruing from
the future build-up of foreign export markets. Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 275. It
also has been suggested that foreign entities will reduce net investments in the United
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tion to the pragmatic objection that extraterritorial antitrust juris-
diction undermines a nation's sovereign ability to regulate and
control the national economy20 and to formulate not only stable
national trading policies but also effective foreign policies, foreign
critics premise objections to antitrust extraterritoriality on the per-
ceived failure of the United States to respect basic principles of
comity.21 This failure to respect comity is likely to occur when sub-
stantive provisions of United States antitrust law condemn con-
duct which is permissible under the antitrust laws of the foreign
nation.22 Another source of objection to the extraterritorial appli-
cation of United States antitrust law concerns the right to bring
private antitrust suits pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).28 This
States in an effort to avoid the possibility of having assets within the United States subject
to attachment in an antitrust proceeding. Id. at 268. Domestic critics also cite the substan-
tial costs entailed by the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law. See in-
fra note 34 and accompanying text.
20 See supra note 5; Feinberg, supra note 19, at 324, where the author states that "foreign
criticism of United States antitrust extraterritoriality is two-pronged: on a political and for-
eign policy level, the United States is seen as a meddler, interfering in the internal political
affeirs of independent foreign states; on an economic level, United States interference is
viewed as a misguided effort, undercutting policies of the foreign states that are designed to
promote internal economic health and stability." See also Diplomatic Note No. 390/79 from
the Australian Embassy to the United States Dep't of State, Oct. 19, 1979, at 3, cited in
Note, supra note 18, at 244 n. 177, in which Australia alerts the United States of the
severe effects which a damages judgment may have on the Australian economy, in
such fields as the financing of resources projects, attraction of foreign investment,
trade in uranium and other commodities, and the financial viability of the four
companies concerned [in the Westinghouse uranium litigation], all of which play a
major role in the production and export of Australian natural resources. These are
Australian domestic concerns.
" Comity is a very small word that stands for a very large principle. Comity is a way
of saying . . . that each of two parties will yield to the one which has interests
that are clearly paramount. It is a word signifying a concern for common courtesy
and decency in conduct toward others. Where conflicts arise between sovereigns,
the sovereigns have an obligation to resolve the conflicts with restraint, coopera-
tion, and goodwill. That is the essence of comity ....
Bell, supra note 1, at 801.
" See Pengilley, Public Benefit in Anticompetitive Arrangements? Australian Experi-
ence Since 1974, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 187 (1978) in which the author describes a provision of
the Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974 under which an Australian business may be
authorized by the government to engage in conduct which is or may be in breach of Austra-
lian antitrust law when such conduct is likely to result in a substantial benefit to the public.
In a situation where an exemption by the Australian government has been granted on the
ground of substantial public benefit, any attempt by the United States to apply its antitrust
law to the exempted conduct is destined to run afoul of even the most restrictive concept of
comity.
" This private right of action originated in section 7 of the Sherman Act and was ex-
panded in 1914 in section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Because it was effec-
tively superseded by section 4 of the Clayton Act, section 7 of the Sherman Act was re-
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"unleashed prosecutorial discretion" accorded to private litigants24
is particularly objectionable to foreign nations because the private
antitrust litigant is hardly inclined to account for considerations of
comity and sovereignty in bringing the suit.25 Foreign nations also
take exception to the provision in United States antitrust law per-
mitting a court to award treble damages to the private plaintiff.26
This treble damage provision is considered grossly unfair by for-
eign nations whose antitrust laws typically do not permit recovery
of treble damages .27 This perception of inequity is perpetuated by
certain policies of the United States government which, in the view
of foreign nations, represent an internally inconsistent antitrust re-
gime. These policies are designed to protect the United States do-
mestic market from foreign competition, thereby effectively cir-
pealed in 1955. Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283.
24 Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 58. Brewster observed that "the ease with which
private plaintiffs can threaten foreign companies not only with the heavy costs of litigation
but the possibility of three times the recovery of actual damages outrages even those of our
foreign friends and allies who understand us best." Id.
' The British Government registered objection to the private damage action by citing
two basically undesirable consequences [which] follow from the enforcement of
public law in this field by private remedies. First, the usual discretion of a public
authority to enforce laws in a way which has regard to the interests of society is
replaced by a motive on the part of the plaintiff to pursue defendants for private
gain thus excluding international considerations of a public nature. Secondly,
where criminal and civil penalties co-exist, those engaged in international trade
are exposed to double jeopardy.
United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note concerning the U.K. Protection of
Trading Interests Bill, No. 225 (Nov. 27, 1979), 21 I.L.M. 847, 849 (1982). An additional
criticism of the private remedy under United States antitrust law is that an individual case
will have an influence disproportionate to its initial factual setting due to the relative pau-
city of antitrust cases in the international field. Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A
Rejoinder, 11 CORNELL INr'L L.J. 215, 257 (1978). For further criticism of this private rem-
edy, see Note, supra note 18. Most foreign nations do not permit private antitrust actions.
See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDE To LEG-
ISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES (1967).
"* The treble damage remedy has been subject to intense criticism. See, e.g., Common-
wealth Nations Adopt Resolution Criticising United States Treble Damage Judgments.
[Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963, at A-10 (May 8, 1980); Sims and
Lawlar, Treble Damages Remedy Deserves Reexamination, Legal Times of Washington,
Oct. 26, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
' Australian antitrust law only enables a private enforcer to claim actual damages. Wal-
ter & Walsh, Overseas Trade and Investment, 2 AusTL. Bus. L. REV. 307, 312 (1974). Al-
though not objecting to the use of multiple damages to promote a particular domestic eco-
nomic policy within the United States, Australian Attorney General Peter Durack notes that
a quite different problem arises when the extraterritorial application of a private remedy
permits Australian trading policies to be superseded. P. DURACK, AUSTRALIA's POSITION ON
U.S. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 13 (1981), cited in Note, supra note 18, at 245 n. 182.
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cumventing the application of United States antitrust laws.28 The
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1976), which exempts
United States export cartels from application of the Sherman Act,
is illustrative of this inconsistency in federal antitrust enforce-
ment.29 Uncertainty with regard to the jurisdictional scope of
United States antitrust law and to the nebulous standards 0 by
18 See generally Ongman, Is Somebody Crying Wolf?, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163, 165
(1979); Note, supra note 18, at 247. The United States efforts to negotiate commodity agree-
ments regulating prices and establishing import quotas are essentially manifestations of eco-
nomic protectionism which seriously implicate the sincerity of the asserted United States
procompetition philosophy. For a discussion of this philosophy, see supra notes 8-12 and
accompanying text. These commodity agreements are negotiated through a variety of mech-
anisms, including: a) international treaty, International Coffee Agreement, Aug. 1, 1977, 28
U.S.T. 6401, T.I.A.S. No. 8683; b) executive agreement, orderly marketing agreements pur-
suant to 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976); and c) diplomatic consultation, foreign steel import quo-
tas, see, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C.
1973). Marks, supra note 8, at 156; see also Jones, Extraterritoriality in United States
Antitrust: An International "Hot Potatoe", 11 INT'L LAW. 415, 428 (1977).
19 In United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59, 66-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1949), an argument is made to rebut the allegation that the export exemption allowed under
the Webb-Pomerene Act is inconsistent with United States antitrust policy. This rebuttal is
based on the idea that, even under the Webb-Pomerene Act, activities such as assigning
international quotas, dividing markets, and fixing prices are not permitted. See Davidow,
supra note 9, at 906. In view of the recently proposed Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1982, H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), however, this rationale may fail since this
Act amends the Sherman and Clayton Acts to exclude from antitrust liability certain con-
duct involving trade with foreign nations so long as such conduct does not have a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or on the export activi-
ties of a domestic individual. This legislative clarification of antitrust liability would argua-
bly condone activities which had previously been disallowed as per se violations of United
States antitrust law. Although this legislation may heighten the allegation of inconsistent
and contradictory federal antitrust enforcement policy, its net effect may be to allay foreign
government concern that United States antitrust extraterritoriality infringes on national
sovereignty. See Report to Accompany Resolutions Concerning Legislative Proposals to
Promote Export Trading, 1981 A.B.A. SEc. ANrrrusT L. 31-34, reprinted in Hearings on S.
432, supra note 7, at 216. See also infra note 127.
3O The jurisdictional scope of United States antitrust law is determined by reference to a
judicially created doctrine commonly referred to as the effects test. The formulations of this
test by courts in the United States are varied and include: 1) the requirement that the
challenged foreign conduct both intend to and actually affect United States imports or ex-
ports, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 443-44; 2) the requirement
that certain effects be demonstrated regardless of whether they were intended or foresee-
able, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979); National
Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,836, at 78,471-72
(2d Cir. 1981); 3) the requirement that a substantial effect on United States foreign com-
merce be demonstrated, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congleum Corp., 598 F.2d at 1292; 4) the
requirement that the challenged conduct directly affect United States export commerce,
Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
modifying 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974); 5) the requirement that the challenged conduct
have some effect on United States foreign commerce, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Anheuser-
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which such jurisdiction is determined further fuels the resentment
of foreign nations to United States extraterritorial antitrust
enforcement.31
A wholly domestic objection to the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law concerns the stifling effect of alleged
uncertainty regarding extraterritorial antitrust enforcement on the
willingness of small and medium size United States manufacturers
to undertake export initiatives in the face of potential antitrust lia-
bility.3 2 Domestic criticism also is founded on the substantial inter-
ference with the diplomatic process caused by United States extra-
territorial antitrust enforcement policy.3 3 The monetary costs
Busch, Inc., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), clarified in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977); 6) the requirement that the challenged con-
duct have any appreciable anticompetitive effects on United States commerce, National
Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,836, at 78,472; and
7) the requirement that the effect on foreign commerce be both substantial and direct as
long as it is not de minimus, Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries,
Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For an analysis of the judicial development of
the effects test and a defense to charges of uncertainty inherent in the test, see Hearings on
S. 432, supra note 7, at 226-36. For a concise history of the major developments of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction through United States case law, see 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 328-31 (1978).
The Department of Justice crystallizes the chameleon-like judicial effects test by stating
that "when foreign transactions have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce,
they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place." ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra
note 1, at 6.
11 One commentator asserts that it is an "intolerable burden to the foreigner to require
him or his lawyer to understand the intricacies of the case law [in the United States] under
the antitrust statutes . . . .By its very nature this type of legislation is replete with uncer-
tainty and unsuited to extraterritorial application." Haight, International Law and the Ex-
traterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 649 (1954). Australian
Attorney General Peter Durack confirms this objection by stating that "we live in a world in
which the repercussions of economic conduct may be infinitely remote. And we criticise, on
that ground, an effects test which is so wide, so vague, and so uncertain." P. DURACK, supra
note 27, at 9.
" This controversy concerning the effect of uncertainty in the extraterritorial application
of United States antitrust law on domestic export potential has culminated in the passage of
the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 which attempts to clarify the antitrust liability of
a United States exporter. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1233. For a related view, compare The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Hear-
ings and Markup on H.R. 1799 Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy
and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1982)
(statement of Jay Angoff, Staff Attorney, Congress Watch, asserting that this export promo-
tion legislation is a mere gimmick designed to impair domestic antitrust enforcement) [here-
inafter cited as Trading Company Hearings], with Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 28
(statement of the Committee on Ocean Liner Conferences of the Maritime Law Ass'n of the
United States, asserting that antitrust uncertainty could effectively paralyze the United
States shipping industry).
3 Joseph P. Griffin, Chairman of the Committee on International Aspects of Antitrust
Law of the International Law Section of the American Bar Association, stated that "the
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incurred by resort to specialized attorneys and diplomats, who are
required to resolve antitrust disputes as well as the loss of foreign
government goodwill, have also been cited as drawbacks to United
States antitrust extraterritoriality.3 4
B. Foreign Legislative Reaction to United States Antitrust
Extraterritoriality
Another significant cost to the United States flowing from the
extraterritorial application of its antitrust law concerns the viru-
lent reaction3 5 on the part of foreign governments which have uni-
laterally responded to the previously mentioned objections to
United States antitrust extraterritoriality. This foreign government
hostility is reflected in foreign blocking legislation enacted to cir-
cumvent United States antitrust enforcement measures and to pro-
hibit the disclosure of information and documents requested by a
court in the United States pursuant to an antitrust proceeding.36
Defensive responses on the part of foreign governments include the
enactment of clawback statutes,3 7 blocking statutes,38 and restric-
commencement of an [American antitrust] agency enforcement action generally preempts
such [diplomatic] consultations and even when they take place, undercuts their utility."
Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 30. In questioning the propriety of the role played by
the judiciary in determining antitrust jurisdiction, one judge has commented that "when the
courts engage in piecemeal adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of states, they
risk disruption of our country's international diplomacy. . . ." International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. O.P.E.C., 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981).
Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State, stated
that disputes regarding United States antitrust extraterritoriality
may deplete the good will of a foreign government as well as its willingness to
cooperate with us on other projects of importance. Such conflicts have other costs
for us. They require the time and effort of specialized attorneys and diplomats to
sort out the pieces when conflicts occur. In the meantime, the U.S. regulatory in-
terest that prompted our action in the first place may be thwarted.
Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7, at 37-38.
" See generally Stanford, supra note 2, at 204; Timberg, supra note 4, at 160; Comment,
Foreign Blocking Legislation: Recent Roadblocks to Effective Enforcement of American
Antitrust Law, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 945 (1981).
" Baker, supra note 4, at 185, cites a "growing number of statutes and orders. . . specifi-
cally designed to thwart antitrust investigations by any foreign power." See, e.g., infra notes
37-39.
37 A clawback statute, designed to punish certain litigants, permits a foreign, multiple
damage, antitrust judgment debtor to recollect from the plaintiff (assuming the plaintiff has
assets within the jurisdiction of the foreign nation) any amount on the judgment in excess of
the actual compensatory damages. Comment, supra note 35, at 956. See, e.g., Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6, reprinted in 1 CURRENT L. STAT. ANN. 11/5 (British
clawback statute). Both Canada and Australia are currently considering implementation of
similar legislation. See, e.g., [1980] ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 980, at A-13
(Australia); Foreign Proceedings and Judgments Bill, [U.S. Export Weekly] INT'L TRADE
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tion of judgment legislation, 9 all of which represent a serious de-
cline in foreign antitrust cooperation which is potentially devastat-
ing to the future enforcement of United States antitrust
regulations. By effectively preventing a United States antitrust liti-
gant from obtaining information and documents located abroad,
foreign blocking legislation could arguably result in haphazard en-
forcement of United States antitrust regulations since antitrust en-
forcement agencies will be compelled to bring cases based on less
evidence. The resulting prejudice to a defendant who is unable to
obtain exculpatory evidence is apparent.4 °
These attempts by foreign governments to shield their nationals
from antitrust liability in the United States are not always success-
ful. For example, the existence of a foreign legislative prohibition
against the disclosure of certain information requested by a United
States court pursuant to an antitrust investigation does not neces-
sarily insulate a foreign defendant from United States antitrust
liability based on a contempt order, since United States courts
often compel the production of such evidence irrespective of the
foreign nondisclosure law.41 The seemingly irreconcilable substan-
RE. (BNA) No. 316, at C-2 (July 22, 1980) (Canada).
Blocking statutes render compliance with foreign judicial requests for evidence illegal.
Comment, supra note 35, at 946 n. 6. For the Australian blocking statute, see Foreign Pro-
ceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, No. 121 (Austl. 1976), as amended by For-
eign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, No. 202 (Austl. 1976),
cited in Note, supra note 18, at 248 n. 206. This Act permits the Australian Attorney Gen-
eral to issue orders ensuring that Australian documents will not be produced before foreign
courts and tribunals when the foreign court exercises jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent
with international law or comity or when such orders are needed for the protection of Aus-
tralian national interests. Id. § 4. For a discussion of the nature of the actions taken by the
Australian Attorney General to enforce these policies, see Note, supra note 18, at 249. For
an extensive compilation of foreign nondisclosure legislation, see Note, Compelling Produc-
tion of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the
American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 877, 877 n. 1 (1982).
" Australia's Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979 confers
broad discretion on the Australian Attorney General to prohibit the enforcement of the for-
eign antitrust judgment or to reduce substantially the judgment amount when the foreign
court has exercised jurisdiction "in a manner inconsistent with international law or comity
and the recognition or enforcement of the judgment in Australia would or might be detri-
mental to or adversely affect, trade or commerce with other countries." No. 13, § 3(2)(b)(i)
(Austl. 1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 869 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Restriction of Enforce-
ment Act].
'0 Baker, supra note 4, at 187.
" See, e.g., Soci6t6 Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1958); Civil Aeronau-
tics Bd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968). But see
Trade Development Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1972).
American courts invariably resort to one of three approaches in deciding whether to com-
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tive differences between respective national economic policies,
which are asserted in the context of the international antitrust dis-
putes, are exacerbated by fundamental differences in national atti-
tudes concerning the propriety of extraterritorial discovery proce-
dures. 2 Moreover, foreign legislation curtailing the extraterritorial
enforcement of an antitrust judgment or contempt order immu-
nizes a foreign defendant from United States antitrust liability
pel production of evidence located abroad. The "good faith" approach, applied in Socitk
Internationale v. Rogers, supra, and in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 480 F.
Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979), does not entail examination of the interests of the foreign na-
tion in prohibiting the production of the evidence, but rather concentrates on whether the
party whose evidence has been requested exercised its best efforts to achieve compliance
with the disclosure order and whether such party deliberately induced the foreign nation to
legislatively block the production of the evidence. This approach is criticised in Note, supra
note 38, at 887, on the ground that it is relevant only to a determination of whether sanc-
tions should be applied for the failure to produce documents and does not address the basic
issue of whether document production is appropriate. A second approach would base the
determination of whether to compel production of evidence on a consideration of five factors
listed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 39-40 (1965). This "balancing test" approach has been rejected by one court as "inher-
ently unworkable," Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., supra, and has been
criticised on the ground that its principal focus is on individual hardship rather than on the
competing national interests at stake. See Note, supra note 38, at 901. For a judicial appli-
cation of this approach, see United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 940 (1976). A third approach, known as the Second Circuit international comity ap-
proach, would accord automatic deference to the foreign nondisclosure law without any as-
sessment of the domestic interest at stake. This approach was abandoned by the Second
Circuit in 1968 in favor of the Restatement balancing test. See Note, supra note 38, at 895
n. 159. For a comprehensive analysis of these three approaches to the nondisclosure di-
lemma, see generally id. The author proposes a scheme designed to minimize conflict poten-
tial by requiring consideration of, inter alia, the need for the information sought, whether
alternative means of producing the information are available, and whether the resisting
party is a plaintiff or defendant. Id. at 903-08. The author concludes that the success of the
United States in obtaining information located abroad is contingent upon its ability to ac-
comodate and respect the policies of foreign nations. Id. at 908.
42 United States discovery procedures are generally more liberal than those of foreign
nations. 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 15.10
(2d ed. 1981). Discovery procedures in civil law countries, moreover, are typically a function
exercised by the judiciary and not by the attorney. Note, supra note 38, at 866. One foreign
court has characterized the United States discovery procedure as a "fishing expedition". Rio
Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 ALL. E.R. 434, 442 (H.L. 1977). For
an examination of international jurisdictional principles regarding the production of docu-
ments and information, see generally Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 139 (1978); Lowenfeld, Extraterritoriality: Conflict and Overlap in National
and International Regulation, 74 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 30 (1980); Onkelinx, Conflict of
International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law
of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 487, 489-501 (1969). For a concise history of United States
participation in international judicial cooperation efforts, see Bishop, International Litiga-
tion in Texas: Obtaining Evidence in Foreign Countries, 19 Hous. L. REV. 361, 367-69
(1982).
1983] U.S.-AUSTRALIA ANTITRUST AGREEMENT
only to the extent that the foreign defendant has no assets within
the United States subject to execution in satisfaction of the debt.43
Considering the enormous difficulties entailed by an asset removal
strategy44 as well as the susceptibility to execution of the foreign
defendant's accounts receivable arising from sales within the
United States," the effective protection against United States an-
titrust sanctions accruing from foreign restriction of judgment leg-
islation is impaired significantly. The legislative impotency of a
foreign sovereign to insulate its nationals from antitrust sanctions
by the United States can only serve to heighten the degree of in-
ternational hostility toward United States antitrust
extraterritoriality.
A recent example of international hostility to extraterritorial an-
titrust enforcement by the United States involved a suit for treble
damages instituted by Westinghouse, Inc. against uranium produc-
ers from several nations, including Australia.46 Westinghouse was
unable to meet various contractual obligations to supply uranium
because of an unprecedented increase in the price of uranium.
Westinghouse alleged that the price increase was due to the forma-
48 In Note, supra note 13, at 770 n. 20, the author observes that an asset withdrawal from
the United States would not defeat in personam jurisdiction under section 22 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976), since existing contacts between the foreign defendants and the
United States arising from "the deliberate and significant impact of (the foreign cartelists']
price fixing activities on the U.S. economy and the substantiality of their United States
sales" would nonetheless satisfy the jurisdictional dictates of United States antitrust stat-
utes. An asset removal strategy is thus effective, if at all (see infra note 44), in thwarting the
enforceability of an antitrust judgment and not in circumventing the jurisdictional basis for
such judgment.
"' Significant drawbacks to an asset removal strategy include the foreign enterprise's in-
ability to realize the full value of its immovable assets since the price received for such
assets in a "forced sale" undeniably reflects the urgency of the transaction and the necessity
for payment in liquid funds or for exchange of assets located outside the United States.
There also exists the risk that the asset purchaser might be considered by a United States
court as an aider and abettor in the prosecuted cartel scheme. See Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The sale price of the asset might be reduced
further by the unfavorable economic conditions at the time of sale, the transaction costs
involved, and any tax consequences arising from the sale. The loss of other advantages in-
herent in maintaining a United States subsidiary operation is alone sufficient to quell any
incentive on the part of a foreign defendant to remove United States assets. Note, supra
note 13, at 771-73.
"' The situs of the debt owed by a United States purchaser to the foreign defendant/seller
is the domicile of the purchaser/debtor. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). As such, that
debt, in the form of accounts receivable, becomes subject to execution to satisfy a judgment.
" Westinghouse filed suit against 12 foreign and 17 domestic uranium producers. Nine of
the 12 foreign defendants defaulted. This barrage of suits, claims, and counterclaims has
been consolidated in Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979). For an
itemization of the suits prior to consolidation, see Note, supra note 18, at 230 n. 91.
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tion of an international uranium cartel which had anticompetitive
effects in the United States.47 The district court's grant of West-
inghouse's motion for default, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, 8 subjected the foreign defendants to liability for
compensatory and punitive damages estimated at six to seven bil-
lion dollars.49 By reason of the potentially staggering effect of these
default judgments on the foreign company's commercial viability,
foreign nations enacted severe foreign blocking legislation"0 and re-
striction of judgment legislation."' This uranium litigation and the
attendant foreign government response thereto provided the impe-
47 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See gener-
ally Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430 (C.A.), rev'd on
additional facts, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.); Note, Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence
(Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323 (1978). For commen-
tary and analysis regarding the uranium litigation, see Joskow, Commercial Impossibility,
The Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1979); Comment,
The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation and Legal Implications, 14 Tax. INT'L L.J.
59 (1979); Rothwell, Market Coordination by the Uranium Oxide Industry, 25 ANUrrrusT
BULL. 233 (1980); J. TAYLOR & M. YOKELL, YELLOWCAKE: THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM CAR-
TEL AND ITS AFTERMATH (1979). For a collection of the documents establishing the existence
of the uranium cartel, see International Supply and Demand: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 151-362 (1976).
" The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals employed the intended effects test of United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), to determine jurisdiction.
The court refused to accord further consideration to the balancing test established in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, supra note 30. The Court decided to stay the
issue of damages until the question of liability had been settled as to the non-defaulting
defendants. Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
' 457 AUsTL. PARL. DEB. 2186 (1976) (statement of Senator Durack), cited in Note, supra
note 18, at 233 n. 109. The defendants could also be charged with payment of the substan-
tial legal fees incurred by the plaintiff in addition to the costs of mounting their own de-
fense. Note, supra note 18, at 233.
" The Canadian government reacted to a United States district court subpoena for infor-
mation in connection with the uranium litigation by enacting legislation prohibiting the re-
lease from Canada of any written materials or documentation relating to any aspect of ura-
nium mining, refining, or marketing. See, e.g., Uranium Information Security Reglations, 3
CAN. CONs. REGs. ch. 366 (1978); Can. Gaz., pt. 11, at 4619 (1977), cited in Note, supra note
18, at 255 n. 249. The Canadian Supreme Court upheld this blocking legislation in the face
of a challenge by Westinghouse in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont.
2d 273 (High Ct. Justice 1977). For Australian blocking legislation enacted pursuant to the
uranium litigation, see supra note 38. For a defensive response expressed by a British court,
see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, supra note 47 (House of Lords
decision refusing to execute United States letters rogatory in the United Kingdom).
"' See supra note 39. The necessity of enacting this type of legislation has been ques-
tioned on the ground that a default judgment such as that entered in the Westinghouse
case, supra note 48, would be unenforceable in Australian courts on the basis of common
law principles. Nygh, The Enforcement of United States Antitrust Judgments in Australia,
16 GONz. L. REv. 1, 14 (1980).
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tus for renewed negotiations between the United States and Aus-
tralia, eventually culminating in an antitrust cooperation agree-
ment between these two nations."
III. UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA AGREEMENT
The antitrust cooperation agreement between the United States
and Australia establishes a detailed notification" and consultation
procedure 4 which is intended to reduce the friction that has arisen
in recent years over United States government and private anti-
trust actions involving Australian government policies and Austra-
lian companies.5 5 The agreement provides that one country may
request consultation when the other country's antitrust policies
raise antitrust concerns in the requesting country. 56 The agreement
stipulates that the United States should fully consider modifica-
tion or discontinuation of antitrust investigations which are precip-
itated by Australian conduct undertaken for the purpose of ob-
taining export permits,57 by conduct undertaken by an Australian
export authority," by conduct related exclusively to exportation to
countries other than the United States, or by conduct involving
discussions with or representations to the Australian government
regarding export policies.60 Each country is further required to ju-
dicially and administratively assist the other with regard to an an-
titrust enforcement action, provided that the proposed action does
not adversely affect the national interests of the assisting coun-
try.61 The agreement secures the confidentiality of information and
documents 2 by prohibiting the United States from using the infor-
mation as evidence in an antitrust investigation. 8 The agreement
also prohibits Australia from automatically blocking compliance by
Australian companies with subpoenas from United States antitrust
agencies and private litigants, provided that prior notice of the
" Telephone interview with Charles Stark, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Divi-
sion, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Sept. 15, 1982); see also Note, supra note 18, at 250.
" Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 1.
" Id. art. 2.
" Antitrust Agreement Press Release, supra note 17, at 1.
" Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2.
Id. art. 2(6)(b)(1).
" Id. art. 2(6)(b)(2).
I d. art. 2(6)(b)(3).
Io d. art. 2(6)(b)(4).
" Id. art. 5(l).
"See id.
"Id. art. 3.
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subpoena has been given." Most significant is the provision per-
mitting Australia to request United States governmental participa-
tion in a private antitrust suit instigated pursuant to a policy of
the Australian government that has previously been the subject of
intergovernmental consultation.s Subsequent to governmental
consultation concerning the implementation of an Australian trade
policy and in the event that the United States concludes that such
policy should not be the basis of an antitrust action, the Australian
government may seek from the United States a statement in writ-
ten form setting forth the basis for such conclusion." Once a writ-
ten memorialization has been obtained, the agreement establishes
a clearance mechanism to approve proposed private conduct in im-
plementation of the Australian policy. 7 In the event that consulta-
tion fails to result in a means for avoiding an antitrust conflict, the
agreement establishes an escape clause pursuant to which each
party remains free to protect its interests as it deems necessary.68
An analysis of the United States-Australia antitrust agreement
as well as an examination of its success in alleviating Australian
concerns over national sovereignty requires a brief consideration of
two previous United States antitrust cooperation agreements with
Canada and with the Federal Republic of Germany. The United
States-Australia agreement can be considered a significant step to-
ward minimizing antitrust difficulties6 s only to the extent that its
provisions are more responsive to antitrust sensitivities than these
two previous bilateral70 antitrust cooperation agreements. In an ef-
fort to achieve a contextually accurate analysis of the Australian
agreement provisions it is necessary, therefore, to assess the suc-
cess of the previous cooperation agreements in resolving interna-
tional antitrust disputes. This attempt to gauge the success of the
Australian agreement through a comparative approach is, however,
inherently limited since a foreign nation's antitrust cooperation
" Id. art. 5(1).
w Id. art. 6.
" Id. art. 4(1).
67 Id.
Id. art. 4(2).
" See Antitrust Agreement Press Release, supra note 17, at 2.
70 Although several international organizations have proposed multilateral antitrust coop-
eration agreements, a discussion of those efforts is outside the scope of this Note. For an
assessment of these various efforts, see generally Timberg, supra note 4; Antitrust Law:
United Nations Guidelines, 22 H~Av. Ir'L L.J. 405 (1981); Markert, Recent Developments
in International Antitrust Cooperation, 13 ANrrwsT BuLL. 355 (1968); Davidow, Toward
an International Antitrust Code, 65 A.B.A.J. 631 (1979).
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agreement with the United States will ostensibly reflect various
disparities with respect to the extraterritorial scope of the foreign
nation's own antitrust regime,71 the existence of a supranational
antitrust enforcement body,7 2 the business and economic tenets of
the particular foreign nation,73 as well as the history of antitrust
enforcement between that foreign nation and the United States.7 '
Cognizant of these caveats, it is now appropriate to consider the
success of previous United States bilateral antitrust cooperation
agreements in resolving antitrust disputes between foreign nations.
A. United States-Canadian Agreement
An informal antitrust understanding between Canada and the
7 The reciprocity arising from the extraterritorial application of foreign antitrust laws
which are substantively comparable to United States antitrust laws mitigates the real value
of comparing an antitrust cooperation agreement between the United States and that for-
eign nation with, for example, an United States antitrust cooperation agreement with a for-
eign nation whose antitrust laws are not applied extraterritorially. This mitigating factor is
particularly pertinent in the case of the United States-West Germany antitrust agreement,
see infra notes 90-99, since West Germany's long arm jurisdiction is similar to the United
States jurisdictional standard of minimum contacts. See U. DROHNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (1972). Furthermore, the scope of West German antitrust
statutes embraces extraterritorial conduct which has anticompetitive affects within West
German borders. See 4 J. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMEICAN ANTITRus. OVERLAP AND
CONFLICT 147 (1970).
7' For example, the existence of an antitrust regulatory authority within the European
Community implicates the comparative value of the United States-West Germany antitrust
agreement. Under the Treaty of Rome, Member States of the Common Market are obliged
to enforce Common Market antitrust laws in their own national courts. Timberg, supra note
4, at 182 n. 87. For information concerning the antitrust regulatory system of the European
Communities, see Allan, The Development of European Economic Communities Antitrust
Jurisdiction Over Alien Undertakings, 2 LEGAL IssuES oi EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 35 (1974).
See also BUSINESS REGULATION IN THE COMMON MARKET (Blake ed. 1969) (exhaustive, three
volume description of the antitrust laws of six European countries); Thiesing, Remarks on
the Extraterritorial Effect of "Antitrust Law" Concerning the European Economic Com-
munity, 25 REc. A. B. CITY N.Y. 206 (1970).
"' For an interesting discussion of the effect of the differing perspectives of Canadian and
United States economic realities on the respective antitrust relationship, see Baker, supra
note 4, at 166-71. The author states that the "Canadian tradition seems to be more of gov-
ernment oversight and control of private economic power, rather than the more structural
approach that characterizes many antitrust and other public policies in the United States."
Id. at 171.
7" A well-established history of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement may render the im-
plementation and effectiveness of an antitrust cooperation agreement more difficult. United
States extraterritorial antitrust enforcement against Canadian companies, for example,
reaches back nearly forty years, beginning with the United States investigation of the Cana-
dian newsprint industry. See Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian
International Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); see also Note, supra note 18, at
253.
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United Siates75 was negotiated to alleviate antitrust tensions be-
tween the two countries.7 6 The efficacy of the understanding in
achieving this objective has been seriously questioned. Reasons
proffered for the failure of the understanding to reduce antitrust
hostility between Canada and the United States center primarily
on its failure to examine the role of antitrust regulation in each
country.77 This failure to appreciate and account for differing na-
tional perspectives regarding basic national antitrust policies is
not, however, the sole explanation for the understanding's lack of
success. Deficiencies inherent in the text of the understanding it-
self preclude the probability of securing tangible and substantial
benefits from the agreement.
This informal antitrust understanding provides for antitrust no-
tification and consultation on a voluntary basis. 78 Although the un-
70 This informal "Antitrust Notification and Consultation Procedure" originated in dis-
cussions held in 1959 between Canadian Minister of Justice E.D. Fulton and United States
Attorney General William P. Rodgers. In 1969, Canadian Consumer and Corporate Affairs
Minister Ron Basford and United States Attorney General John Mitchell advanced the orig-
inal Fulton-Rodgers understanding by agreeing that the OECD guidelines for antitrust co-
operation contained in ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REC-
OMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON
REsTriucnv BuSINESs PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1967) should be actively
implemented between the two countries. Canada-United States: Joint Statement Concern-
ing Cooperation in Antitrust Matters, U.S. Dep't of Justice (press release Nov. 3, 1969),
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1305 (1969) [hereinafter cited as United States-Canadian Joint
Statement].
" Cambell, The Canada-United States Antitrust Notification and Consultation Proce-
dure: A Study in Bilateral Conflict Resolution, 56 CAN. B. REV. 459 (1978). The author
states that "the American Government, accepting the extraterritorial reach of [United
States] antitrust law as rational and necessary, believed the procedure would lessen tensions
by keeping Canada informed and in mind." Id. at 494.
" Id. at 480. The author analogizes the effectiveness of the Canadian-United States un-
derstanding in resolving antitrust disputes to "an attempt to treat a compound fracture
with aspirin. The aspirin would no doubt relieve part of the pain, but could never really get
to the root of the problem." Id. at 494.
78 United States-Canadian Joint Statement, supra note 75, at 1306-07. That the United
States-Australia agreement is an executive agreement rather than a treaty does not render
its provisions any less binding on the signatories. In international law, "treaties and execu-
tive agreements both constitute equally binding obligations on the nation. The binding ef-
fect of international law takes place as soon as the state has properly consented to the obli-
gation and does not depend on the form of the particular undertaking." The Under
Secretary of State (Webb) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson), Jan. 17, 1950, cited in 14
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 212 (1970); DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES art. 1 comment on use of the term "treaty" (Harvard Research in International
Law 1935), reprinted in 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 653, 697 (Supp. 1935). The International Law
Commission also has commented that "the law relating to such matters as validity, opera-
tion and effect, execution and enforcement, interpretation, and termination, applies to all
classes of international agreements. . . ." [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 188. For an analy-
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derstanding contemplates antitrust cooperation in the form of ex-
change of information, the confidentiality of such information is
not secured by the agreement.79 Without that necessary safeguard,
information disclosure is inhibited. Although formally reciting the
need for antitrust cooperation with due regard to sovereignty, 80 the
understanding fails to set forth specific circumstances under which
antitrust consultation should be implemented.81 Conspicuously ab-
sent from the understanding is any treatment of Canadian block-
ing legislation. " Moreover, the agreement does not contemplate
United States participation in an antitrust action where Canadian
concerns over national sovereignty theoretically would be repre-
sented.83 Unlike the Australian agreement, the Canadian under-
standing fails to grapple with the sensitive issue of foreign export
cartel activity. 4 As previously mentioned, United States antitrust
sanctions against foreign cartelization have operated as catalysts to
the enactment of foreign blocking legislation.85 The United States-
Canadian agreement also fails to establish a mechanism compara-
ble to that established under the Australian agreement, which en-
ables Australia to request a written memorialization containing the
official United States government position regarding the imple-
mentation of a specific Australian trade or export policy.86 Lack of
concrete terms, workable standards, and overall detail pervades
sis of the effect of the escape clause provision contained in article 4 of the Australian agree-
ment, supra note 16, on the binding nature of the agreement, see infra notes 132-35 and
accompanying text.
79 Compare United States-Canadian Joint Statement, supra note 75, at 1307 with Anti-
trust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 3 (prohibiting the unconsented disclosure of informa-
tion and documents exchanged pursuant to the agreement).
80 United States-Canadian Joint Statement, supra note 75, passim.
S The understanding recites that "each country has the responsibility to enforce its own
laws and the discussions under these procedures do not in any way bind a country as to
what action it decides to take." Id. at 1307. Compare id. with Antitrust Agreement, supra
note 16, art. 2(6)(b)(1)-(4) (detailing specific circumstances which should lead United States
antitrust authorities to discontinue or modify existing antitrust investigations). For a discus-
sion of the binding effect of the United States-Australia agreement, see supra note 79, and
infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
" But cf. Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. (5)1 (mandating disclosure of informa-
tion in antitrust investigations).
63 But cf. id. art. 6 (requiring the United States to participate in private antitrust suits
and to disclose the substance and outcome of consultations with Australia).
"The Canadian understanding vaguely states that a "primary concern would be cartel
and other restrictive agreements .... " United States-Canadian Joint Statement, supra
note 75, at 1308. Compare id. with Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(6)(b)(1-4)
(detailed treatment accorded Australian export activity).
See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
" See discussion infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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the agreement. These various omissions and inadequacies reflect
the above-mentioned failure to assess the fundamental underlying
antitrust objectives of each nation. An unfortunate testimonial to
the agreement's essential failure 7 was the ineffectiveness of the
agreement in attenuating the antitrust conflicts concerning the
potash and uranium litigation during the mid-1970's8s Thus, it al-
ready is apparent that, if the Australian antitrust agreement is to
achieve a higher degree of efficacy in resolving United States-Aus-
tralian antitrust disputes, it must fill the gaps which are present in
the United States-Canadian antitrust understanding.
B. United States-West German Agreement
Although an antitrust cooperation agreement between the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany 9 more closely
resembles the detailed provisions of the United States-Australia
agreement than it does the United States-Canadian understanding,
the success of the agreement in resolving antitrust disputes may be
attributable to the substantive compatibility of the West German
antitrust law with that of the United States, rather than to the
viability of the actual technical apparatus of the agreement.90 This
factor, coupled with the existence of the European Economic Com-
munity,91 a supranational antitrust authority which provides an al-
ternative route to exclusive negotiation with Germany, impairs the
reliability of comparing the success of the Australian agreement
with that of the West German agreement. It is useful, however, to
examine the extent to which the West German agreement neglects
to confront certain issues regarding antitrust cooperation since
7 One Canadian commentator asserts that the main value of the agreement at this point
is in explaining United States actions and thereby hopefully avoiding diplomatic repercus-
sions. The author notes that the United States Antitrust Division "has never been deterred
[by the agreement] from proceeding with an issue that it regarded as very serious." Cambell,
supra note 76, at 492.
" See id. at 491.
8 Agreement Relating to Multilateral Cooperation on Restrictive Business Practices,
June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No.
8291; [1978] 5 TRADE REG. Rm. (CCH) 50,283 [hereinafter cited as United States-West
German Agreement].
" See supra note 71. West German antitrust law accords the private plaintiff a cause of
action, although recovery of treble damages is not permitted. 5 J. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD
LAW OF COMPETTION § 23.02 [6] (1981).
" See supra note 72. The European Economic Community has accepted the effects test
expressed by the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, supra note
30. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
31 (1977).
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these issues, for the most part similarly neglected by the United
States-Canadian agreement, suggest those elements which must be
addressed adequately by the Australian agreement to obtain even a
semblance of antitrust harmony between Australia and the United
States.
The United States-West German antitrust cooperation agree-
ment addresses neither issues of blocking legislation92 nor United
States governmental participation in private antitrust suits against
West German companies. 93 The use of information and documents
exchanged pursuant to the agreement is restricted; however, use of
the information as evidence in a United States private antitrust
action is permitted. " Similar to the Canadian agreement, the West
German agreement does not address foreign export cartel activ-
ity.9" In addition, compliance by either party with the terms of the
agreement concerning information exchange and assistance is con-
ditioned on consistency with the domestic law, security, public pol-
icy, or other important national interests of the complying party.96
Although this is a desirable limitation, the agreement fails to de-
fine the circumstances under which compliance with an informa-
tion request would be inconsistent with the public policy or na-
tional interests of the requested country.97  Furthermore, the
United States-West German antitrust agreement does not provide
a clearance mechanism whereby antitrust conflict arising from
West German private conduct could be prevented, and not merely
" The agreement simply provides that no country will interfere with the antitrust investi-
gation or proceeding of the other unless the proceeding is incompatible with the domestic
laws, security, public policy, or other important national interests. United States-West Ger-
man Agreement, supra note 89, art. 4(1). Compare id. with Antitrust Agreement, supra note
16, art. 5(2).
'3 The agreement, however, would seemingly authorize West German participation in
such a suit. United States-West German Agreement, supra note 89, art. 2(3). Compare id.
with Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 6.
" The agreement stipulates that information received pursuant to assistance under the
agreement will be used only for the purposes set forth in article 2, paragraph 1, one of which
specifies assistance in connection with an antitrust investigation or proceeding. See United
States-West German Agreement, supra note 89, art. 5. Compare id. with Antitrust Agree-
ment, supra note 16, art. 3. The West German agreement authorizes a requested party to
impose conditions on the transmission of information in order to "protect the confidentiality
of information requested." United States-West German Agreement, supra note 89, art.
3(1)(c).
9' See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
" United States-West German Agreement, supra note 89, art. 3(1)(a)(b).
' But cf. Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 5(2) (stipulating that, given prior no-
tice, a mere judicial request for information located in Australia does not constitute an ad-
verse effect on the laws, policies, or national interests of Australia).
1983]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
cured, as does the Australian antitrust agreement.9" This brief
analysis of the West German agreement reveals that the issues
which were not addressed by the Canadian agreement remain
largely unresolved by the West German agreement. The Australian
agreement could prove equally ineffective in bridging these gaps in
international antitrust harmony unless its provisions explicitly
confront these omissions so as to give Australia effective sovereign
control over national economic policy.
C. Analysis of United States-Australia Agreement
To the extent permissible in a bilateral agreement,"' the United
States-Australia agreement attenuates Australian concerns over
national sovereignty caused by United States extraterritorial anti-
trust enforcement. This is largely because provisions concerning
export activity, information use restrictions, and United States
participation in domestic antitrust suits address the very reasons
for which Australian blocking legislation was originally enacted. 100
In addition, the agreement contains an escape clause which, if judi-
ciously invoked, further guarantees preservation of Australian sov-
ereignty in areas of critical national economic importance. The
agreement also establishes a clearance mechanism affording lim-
ited antitrust immunity to Australian firms and entities which, al-
though subject to criticism as a misguided effort, does serve to per-
petuate the spirit of antitrust cooperation and conflict avoidance.
1. Language of Agreement
Prefatory to a detailed analysis of these various factors, however,
is the observation that the language of the agreement itself implic-
itly recognizes that the paramount issue at stake in the agreement
is the effect of United States antitrust extraterritoriality on Aus-
tralian national sovereignty. A basic imbalance in the language of
See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
" Many commentators insist that, because of fundamental differences between nations
regarding antitrust philosophies and proper limits to national sovereignty, a bilateral anti-
trust cooperation procedure is an ultimately inadequate vehicle for the resolution of interna-
tional antitrust disputes. See, e.g., Cambell, supra note 76, at 494.
'" Although the agreement does not explicitly provide for the regulation or curtailment
of the Restriction of Enforcement Act, supra note 39, the purpose in enacting this type of
blocking legislation is consonant with the purpose of the antitrust agreement itself, i.e., to
avoid antitrust activity which is inconsistent with comity and which adversely affects trade
or commerce with other countries. The agreement therefore, implicitly addresses this type
of blocking legislation.
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the agreement supports this proposition. When the Australian gov-
ernment adopts a policy that it considers may have antitrust impli-
cations for the United States, the agreement provides that the
Australian government may notify the United States of such pol-
icy.101 In the event, however, that the Department of Justice or the
Federal Trade Commission undertakes an antitrust investigation
that may implicate Australian laws, policies, or national interests,
the agreement mandates that the United States shall notify Aus-
tralia of the investigation.102 Subsequent to notification from the
United States that an antitrust investigation may have antitrust
implications for Australian laws, policies, or national interests, the
government of Australia may request consultation concerning the
investigation pursuant to the agreement.'0 3 The United States, on
the other hand, may request such consultation only if the Austra-
lian policy may have significant antitrust implications under
United States law.'04 In essence, the implications for Australian
law of an antitrust investigation by the United States are not re-
quired to be significant in order for Australia to avail itself of the
consultation procedure. The use of these differing standards sug-
gests a recognition by the negotiating parties that one of the pri-
mary purposes of the agreement is to placate Australian resent-
ment towards the usurpation of national sovereignty resulting from
United States antitrust extraterritoriality. The ensuing analysis
will therefore assess the efficacy of the agreement in achieving that
objective.
2. Export Provisions
The Australian antitrust agreement deals with Australian export
activity in a manner which preserves Australian national sover-
eignty in the face of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. As a
consequence of the agreement's treatment of Australian export ac-
tivity, Australia's ability to implement national trading policies is
enhanced. 0 5 The detailed treatment of Australian export activity,
101 Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 1(1).
l0 "[TIhe Government of the United States shall notify the Government of Australia
." Id. art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
103 Id. art. 2(1).
104 Id. art. 2(2).
10" The jurisdictional threat to Australian export and other trading policies resulting from
United States antitrust extraterritoriality is Australia's primary concern. Commentary by
Mr. J.H. Greenwall, Attorney-General's Department, Australia, at the International Trade
Law Seminar 1981, Extraterritorial Application of Canadian and Foreign Antitrust Laws 4,
19831
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including explicit reference to exportation of natural resources, as-
sures Australia that United States antitrust interference with Aus-
tralian economic policy and natural resource marketing and pricing
practices will be minimized. 10 6 Assuming that the United States
does, in fact, modify or discontinue antitrust investigations related
to Australian export activity in accordance with article 2(6)(b)(3)
of the agreement, 10 7 any Australian perception of inconsistency re-
sulting from the United States Webb-Pomerene export cartel ex-
emption '08 will also be substantially reduced.
Article 2(6)(b)(4) of the agreement may even compel United
States courts to recognize to a greater extent Australian govern-
mental representations to and discussions with an Australian ex-
porter'09 as a valid defense in a United States antitrust action
against the exporter." ' The present state of case law in the United
States would exempt a private antitrust defendant from antitrust
liability for an act committed abroad which was commanded, not
merely encouraged, by the foreign government when the act occurs
within the territory of the commanding sovereign and the private
defendant has not induced the foreign sovereign to issue the com-
cited in Note, supra note 18, at 245 n. 181.
104 See Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(6)(b)(l)-(4).
,07 Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(6)(b)(3), provides that United States anti-
trust enforcement agencies shall consider modification of an antitrust investigation aimed at
Australian conduct "related exclusively to the exportation from Australia to countries other
than the United States, and otherwise than for the purpose of re-exportation to the United
States, of Australian natural resources of goods manufactured or produced in Australia
... " It should be noted that one Canadian commentator observes that despite the ex-
isting United States-Canadian antitrust understanding, the Canadian governmental involve-
ment in a uranium cartel, although made abundantly clear to the United States Antitrust
Division, resulted in no modification of the pending antitrust civil action in the absence of a
solid legal ground for desisting. Cambell, supra note 76, at 471.
'"' See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
'9 Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(6)(b)(4), provides that United States anti-
trust enforcement agencies shall consider modification of an antitrust investigation aimed at
Australian conduct which "consisted of representations to, or discussions with, the Govern-
ment of Australia or an Australian authority in relation to the formulation or implementa-
tion of a policy of the Government of Australia with respect to the exportation from Austra-
lia of Australian natural resources or goods manufactured or produced in Australia."
13 United States courts recognize that when a private party is engaged in a trade re-
straint which has been commanded by the foreign state as sovereign, the private party con-
stitutes an involuntary actor and is, therefore, exempt from United States antitrust laws.
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 790-90 (1975); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). See generally Gra-
ziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Laws, 7
VA. J. INT'L L. 100 (1967); Note, International Law-Extraterritoriality-Antitrust
Law-Development of the Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MICH. L. REv. 888 (1971).
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mand."1 The Australian agreement impliedly relaxes the require-
ments for invocation of this foreign sovereign compulsion defense
by requiring the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Com-
mission to fully consider suspension of an antitrust proceeding or
investigation when such investigation concerns, not conduct arising
from an Australian governmental mandate, but rather conduct re-
sulting from export discussions with the Australian government or
with an Australian export authority. If a moderation of the foreign
compulsion defense is indeed the effect of this agreement provi-
sion, then the agreement has succeeded in securing Australian sov-
ereignty in the area of export activity.
3. Information Use Restrictions
In addition to assuring Australian sovereign control over export
and trade policy, the United States-Australia antitrust agreement
also assures greater compliance by Australian companies with Aus-
tralian governmental requests for information which will be trans-
mitted to United States antitrust enforcement agencies pursuant
to the antitrust agreement. Australian firms should be more willing
to supply the requested information to the Australian government
since the antitrust agreement mandates that information supplied
by the Australian government will not be used as evidence without
consent in a United States judicial or administrative proceeding.' 12
. The foreign sovereign compulsion defense is premised on the idea of according special
deference to acts carried out under a foreign government mandate. Note, supra note 38, at
902. See, e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1296-98 (D. Del. 1970). This court recognized a complete foreign compulsion defense since
the defendant neither acted voluntarily in complying with the foreign government command
nor induced the foreign government to issue the command. Griffin, American Antitrust Law
and Foreign Governments: An Introduction to the Problem, 13 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 137, 143
(1978). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice disputes this decision and
would premise the availability of the defense on the following five factors: (1) the foreign
government must command and not merely encourage the proscribed conduct; (2) the con-
duct must have taken place within the territory of the foreign sovereign; (3) the command
must have been legal under the law of the foreign nation; (4) the defendant must have acted
reasonably in complying with the command; and (5) the balancing of comity interests must
favor the foreign sovereign over American antitrust law. Id. at 144. The author criticizes this
interpretation as an overextended judicial inquiry which fails to account for binding orders
of a nonstatutory nature. For further criticism of the Department of Justice's restrictive
interpretation of the foreign compulsion defense as hypothetically illustrated by Case K of
the ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 1, see Fugate, The Department of Justice's Antitrust
Guide for International Operations, 17 VA. J. Isrr'L L. 645, 682 (1977). For a listing of
materials concerning the background of the foreign compulsion defense, see Note, Foreign
Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. Rav. 131, 142 n. 48.
... Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 3.
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Thus, Australian control over private business conduct should not
be appreciably influenced by the threat to Australian companies of
United States antitrust liability which might have previously de-
terred the Australian firm from compliance with an Australian gov-
ernmental request for information. This provision, moreover, as-
sures viable Australian antitrust cooperation rather than a mere
token exchange of information. Absent assurance that the informa-
tion will not be used in a manner inimical to Australian national
interests, Australia would understandably decline to provide the
information sought."' The agreement allows Australia to provide
information about Australian companies without alienating those
companies since any United States antitrust investigation involv-
ing the companies must arise independently of any information ob-
tained from the Australian government pursuant to the agree-
ment.1" ' This information use restriction also indirectly secures
Australian national sovereignty since the resulting sincere and via-
ble exchange of information will arguably increase the overall effi-
cacy of the consultation procedure in resolving the antitrust con-
flicts between the United States and Australia.
4. United States Government Participation in Antitrust Suits
Another potential hallmark of the agreement's success in calm-
ing Australian concerns resulting from the threat to its national
sovereignty presented by United States antitrust enforcement ac-
tions is the provision permitting Australia to request United States
'participation in a private antitrust suit against an Australian com-
pany.11 5 This provision, by requiring United States courts to take
into account the substance and outcome of prior intergovernmen-
tal consultation, assures Australia that factors of sovereignty and
comity will be represented in an antitrust action commenced by a
private litigant."' In addition to explicitly confronting the primary
Australian objection to United States antitrust extraterritorial-
ity,11 7 this provision also accords to both countries an incentive to
cooperate actively in the consultation process since the fruits of
11 See Stanford, supra note 2, at 211.
Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 3, provides that "the Government of the
United States shall not, however, be foreclosed ... from initiating a proceeding based on
evidence obtained from sources other than the Government of Australia."
"' Id. art. 6.
For a discussion of foreign government objections to the private damages remedy ac-
corded an antitrust plaintiff, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 105.
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consultation, by virtue of use as evidence in an antitrust proceed-
ing, will have a visible and concrete effect on the resolution of anti-
trust conflict. If United States government participation in private
antitrust suits does result in a decreased threat of United States
antitrust liability for Australian companies, then compliance by
these companies with Australian government economic policies
and directives ' has been further secured by the agreement.
By securing effective protection against infringement of Austra-
lian sovereignty by United States antitrust extraterritoriality, the
cumulative effect of these three provisions is to minimize the in-
centive for Australian defensive blocking legislation. The agree-
ment is not confined, however, to implicit treatment of blocking
legislation.1 9 By defining a standard for antitrust cooperation '2
and by specifying that the mere seeking by legal process of infor-
mation and documents is not violative of that standard,"1 the
agreement explicitly confronts what is perhaps the most sensitive
antitrust difficulty between the United States and Australia."'
This direct treatment of Australian blocking legislation, buttressed
by provisions regarding Australian export activity, information use
restrictions, and United States government participation in private
antitrust suits, not only assures a greater degree of antitrust har-
mony between the United States and Australia, but also provides a
model for future bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements which
fills the gaps in such previous United States antitrust cooperation
agreements.
5. Clearance Mechanism
This conception of the Australian agreement as a model bilateral
antitrust cooperation agreement is marred, however, in one re-
spect. In an apparent effort to secure further tangible and concrete
results from the consultation procedure, the United States-Austra-
lia antitrust agreement provides that if the Department of Justice
See supra note 5.
,' See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
Cooperation is required in regard to an antitrust investigation to the extent permissi-
ble by applicable national law and so long as the investigation does not "adversely affect the
laws, policies, or national interests" of the cooperating country. Antitrust Agreement, supra
note 16, art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
12 Id. art. 5(2).
.. See generally Comment, supra note 35. United States Attorney General William
French Smith stated that the Australian agreement's provision limiting the use of Austra-
lian blocking legislation was "particularly helpful". Antitrust Agreement Press Release,
supra note 17, at 3.
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or the Federal Trade Commission concludes that the implementa-
tion of a particular Australian policy which has previously been the
subject of consultation should not be a basis for a United States
antitrust action, the government of Australia may request a writ-
ten memorialization stating the basis for the conclusion. 23 This
innovative feature of the agreement initially resembles a prevent-
ative mechanism designed to achieve predictability and stability by
forewarning Australian entities of activity which potentially would
be actionable under United States antitrust law. Unfortunately,
the agreement stops short of this blanket approval approach. The
requested written memorialization is merely a prerequisite to a
second stage in this clearance procedure, a request by a private
Australian entity for a statement of enforcement intentions with
respect to proposed private conduct in implementation of the Aus-
tralian policy.124 The statement of enforcement intentions is exe-
cuted in accordance with the Department of Justice's Business Re-
view Procedure or the Federal Trade Commission's Advisory
Opinion Procedure, as the case may be. 12
5
This two-tier clearance mechanism appears contradictory, if not
altogether unnecessary. If the United States government effectively
concludes that the implementation of an Australian policy should
not form the basis for an antitrust action, then it should not be
necessary to embroil a private Australian firm in the bureaucratic
intricacies126 of United States antitrust enforcement agencies. Al-
"' Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 4(1).
324 Id.
12s Id.
"s For criticism of a comparable certification procedure recently enacted by Congress in
the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, supra note 32, see Hearings on S. 432, supra
note 7, at 239-42. Although the Export Trading Company Act establishes a certification
scheme designed to immunize United States firms from antitrust liability for export activi-
ties, the criticism leveled at the certification procedure is equally applicable to the clearance
procedure established by the Australian agreement. It has been argued that the mere availa-
bility of such clearance mechanisms would lead the courts, or at least some businessmen, to
assume that activities undertaken without resort to the clearance mechanism would be more
susceptible to a full-fledged antitrust challenge. Id. at 242 (statement of James R. Atwood).
This represents the functional antithesis of the intended result under the Australian agree-
ment. The debate concerning the effectiveness of the certification procedure under the Ex-
port Trading Company Act led to the proposal of the Foreign Antitrust Improvement Act,
supra note 29. This legislation amends the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission
Act to immunize conduct from antitrust liability involving trade or commerce with foreign
nations, other than import transactions, unless the conduct has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or on the export activities of a domestic
individual. [U.S. Export Weekly] INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 419, at 679 (Aug. 10, 1982).
This generic approach embraced by the Foreign Antitrust Improvement Act is conceptually
[Vol. 13:49
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though this provision may afford a degree of precision and predict-
ability to the Australian firm, such attributes are equally attaina-
ble through the blanket approval method of the first tier, the
written memorialization. The disadvantages to the firm, of compli-
ance with the Business Review Procedure in terms of usefulness,127
reliability, ' and disclosure requirements, 2 9 outweigh the slight
advantage in resorting to the clearance mechanism. Rather than
freeing Australian sovereignty from the harness of United States
equivalent to the blanket approval method established under the first tier of article 4 of the
Australian agreement, supra note 16. If the Australian agreement were confined to a ge-
neric, blanket approval approach, the problem of illusory protection under the Business Re-
view Procedure, discussed infra notes 127-29, would be largely circumvented while Austra-
lian sovereignty would be further secured. For a detailed discussion of the recently enacted
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and the Foreign Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982
and their relationship to United States antitrust laws, see generally Hearings on S. 432,
supra note 7, and Trading Company Hearings, supra note 32.
117 During the period from 1970 to 1980, approximately 22 business reviews were sought
concerning proposed international activity. Davidow, U.S. Antitrust and Doing Business
Abroad: Recent Trends and Developments, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. RFo. 23, 31 (1980). In
view of the apparent reluctance on the part of United States exporters to seek business
review of proposed international business transactions, it seems misleading to anticipate
that antitrust harmony will result by virtue of frequent recourse to this procedure by Aus-
tralian entities.
"28 The protection available to an Australian firm pursuant to the Business Review Proce-
dure is alarmingly fragile. "A business review letter states only the enforcement intention of
the [Antitrust] Division as of the date of the letter, and the Division remains completely
free to bring whatever action or proceeding it subsequently comes to believe is required by
the public interest." Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6(9)
(1982). The issuance of a business review letter is not to be interpreted as indicating that
the Division believes that there are no anticompetitive consequences warranting considera-
tion by an antitrust enforcement agency. Id. § 50.6(7)(a).
"9 Each request for review must be accompanied by "all relevant data including back-
ground information, complete copies of all operative documents, and detailed statements of
all collateral oral understandings, if any. . . ... Id. § 50.6(5). The Antitrust Division is fur-
ther authorized not only to request additional information but also to conduct whatever
independent investigation it believes is appropriate. Id. All information acquired pursuant
to the Business Review Procedure is indexed and placed on public file. Id. § 50.6(10)(b). A
requesting party may submit to the Antitrust Division a petition for nondisclosure by indi-
cating that "disclosure would have a detrimental effect . .. upon the requesting parties'
operations or relationships with actual or potential customers, employees, suppliers (includ-
ing suppliers of credit), stockholders or competitors." Id. § 50.6(10)(c)(3). In the event that
the Antitrust Division determines that nondisclosure is justified, the Division nonetheless
retains the right to issue a press release generally describing the identity of the requesting
party and the nature of the action taken by the Division with regard to the request. Id. §
50.6(10)(d). Significantly, any information obtained under the business review procedure
may be used by the Division for all governmental purposes. Id. § 50.6(11) (emphasis
added). Commentators argue that compulsory disclosure of competitively sensitive informa-
tion functions as an effective deterrent to resort to a preclearance mechanism such as that
established under the business review procedure. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 432, supra note 7,
at 242.
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antitrust regulation, this particular provision of the agreement
brings Australian firms further into a regulatory quagmire. This
provision is not consonant with the very purpose of the agree-
ment 30 because it may leave Australian business conduct subject
to intense examination by United States antitrust enforcement
agencies. In light of the deficiencies inherent in this clearance pro-
cedure and the consequent improbability of resort to the procedure
by Australian firms, the inclusion of this option in the agreement is
difficult to reconcile on any basis other than an attempt by the
Department of Justice to increase the importance and perceived
value of domestic antitrust enforcement agencies at the expense of
sincere concern regarding Australian sovereignty.131
6. Escape Clause
The deleterious effect on Australian sovereignty from the agree-
ment's provision in article 4 subjecting Australian firms to the De-
partment of Justice Business Review Procedure is mitigated some-
what by the escape clause contained in that same article. This
provision states that if the consultation procedure fails to resolve
conflicting antitrust laws, policies, or national interests, "each
party shall be free to protect its interests as it deems necessary."''
An immediate and perhaps understandable reaction to the inclu-
sion of an escape clause would be to construe its existence as effec-
tively negating any binding or obligatory character of the bilateral
agreement. s This reaction should be tempered, first, by the reali-
zation that the escape clause option becomes operative only after
efforts have been made to resolve the controversy by resort to the
consultation procedure.' Second, even assuming arguendo that
I The preamble to the Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, recognizes the necessity of
antitrust conflict resolution "with mutual respect for each other's sovereignty . The
force of this criticism is somewhat mitigated by the Australian government's repeated ac-
knowledgment during negotiation of the agreement that "private suits brought by parties in
the United States were a greater problem, in the Australian view, than enforcement actions
of the United States Government." Antitrust Agreement Press Release, supra note 17, at 1.
Is' Notwithstanding the lack of a viable substantive contribution to the resolution of anti-
trust conflicts, the two-tier clearance mechanism arguably is inequitable. Since Australian
firms are subject to antitrust prosecution by United States agencies in the first place, a
balanced and rational analysis should lead to a result whereby an Australian firm would
have standing to seek a business review procedure from that agency without a prior written
memorialization from the United States government.
13 Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16, art. 4(2).
I" For authority asserting the proposition that consent by one nation to a treaty obliga-
tion establishes the binding nature of the agreement irrespective of form, see supra note 78.
' s The escape clause is available if no method for avoiding conflict has been developed
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the escape clause renders the Australian agreement voluntary and
nonbinding in nature, it is quite plausible that a voluntary agree-
ment would nonetheless result in substantial adherence to the pro-
visions of the agreement.""
A closer examination of the advantages to Australia accruing
from the availability of the escape clause option further reveals the
inappropriateness of the proposed argument that the escape clause
renders the agreement voluntary. The escape clause essentially af-
fords Australia a degree of flexibility and discretion to designate
certain vital areas of commercial activity as immune from interfer-
ence by United States antitrust enforcement agencies while simul-
taneously retaining the other advantages and benefits arising from
the agreement. This power of selectivity assumes that invocation of
the escape clause by Australia would free Australia to protect its
interests by permitting enactment and application of the appropri-
ate type of blocking legislation in order to prevent United States
"through consultations pursuant to [the] agreement." Antitrust Agreement, supra note 16,
art. 4(2).
,35 With regard to multilateral agreements, the argument has been made that even an
expressly voluntary code of international business conduct may be binding to a certain de-
gree by virtue of the "considerable impact on the behavior of the parties involved" which
results from implementation machinery providing for reporting, consultation, communica-
tion, and clarification. Sanders, Implementing International Codes of Conduct for Multina-
tional Enterprises, 30 Am. J. CoMP. L. 241, 254 (1982). Many commentators reason that the
controversy as to the merits of a distinction between voluntary and binding international
business codes is illusory since external factors arising from noncompliance will operate to
assure a viable degree of adherence to the agreed voluntary code. See, e.g., Plaine, The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 11 INT'L LAW. 339, 343-45 (1977). These
pragmatic factors include the difficulty encountered by a noncomplying business firm in
obtaining diplomatic protection in the foreign country, in acquiring adequate insurance, and
in procuring financing through international monetary institutions. For the United States
position that a broad range of effective consultative mechanisms is possible even within the
parameters of a voluntary code, see Hearings on Codes of Conduct for Multinational Cor-
porations Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) (statement of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs). In view of these considera-
tions, the argument that the existence of an escape clause renders the Australian agreement
voluntary in nature loses a great deal of its persuasive force. Compare id. with Davidow &
Chiles, supra note 12, at 268 (citing the general attitude that the voluntary, nonpublic, bi-
lateral, diplomatic approach to international business conflict resolution constitutes a cos-
metic formula designed to indicate goodwill and diplomatic accessibility while actually dis-
guising a basic unwillingness to surrender national discretion in the economic arena). It also
is argued that in the context of multilateral codes of business conduct, the voluntary na-
ture-binding effect dispute is largely academic since most significant trading nations have
existing national legislation concerning restrictive business practices which would tend to
negate the independent effect of a multilateral international code of business conduct on the
economic welfare of the nation. Id. at 270.
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antitrust interference. This selectivity further assumes that, during
the consultation procedure, the mere threat by Australia to invoke
the escape clause would result in United States deference to the
business activity under consideration. This latter assumption is
valid only to the extent that Australian negotiating tactics during
the consultation procedure remain judicious and sophisticated with
regard to the circumstances under which invocation of the escape
clause should be threatened. In essence, there may exist certain
activities, such as mining, conducted by foreign entities in Austra-
lia which the Australian government deems so essential to its econ-
omy that interference with them by United States antitrust en-
forcement agencies would not be countenanced under any
circumstances by the Australian government on the ground of pro-
tection of sovereignty over the national economy.1" In this way,
the determination of whether to invoke the escape clause mecha-
nism becomes a function of the value of the business activity under
consideration to Australian economic integrity. The escape clause,
by operating as a bargaining chip for Australia during negotiation
pursuant to the agreement,1 37 goes to great lengths to soothe anti-
trust conflicts arising from the Australian perception of United
States antitrust extraterritoriality as an intrusion on its sovereign
right to direct and control vital domestic economic sectors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States-Australia antitrust agreement should operate
to forestall and resolve antitrust conflicts because its provisions
reconcile the substantive and procedural antitrust grievances be-
tween the United States and Australia. The agreement not only
fosters Australian control over domestic export activity, but also
I" Of course, the argument that absolute sovereignty in this sense would result in all
cases if there were no antitrust agreement whatsoever misses the point since the United
States would, absent any agreement, extraterritorially enforce antitrust laws. The existence
of the agreement otherwise provides United States antitrust officials with an incentive to
defer to Australian sovereignty, in circumstances in which Australia threatens to use the
escape clause, in an attempt to perpetuate a cooperative basis for future consultation under
the agreement.
" The bargaining value to Australia of threatened reliance on the escape clause to cir-
cumvent obligations of the antitrust cooperation agreement does not unduly tip the scales in
favor of Australia. This is true especially in light of the extensive use made by the United
States of its extraterritorial antitrust enforcement scheme, including private treble damages
suits, as a potent foreign policy weapon to pressure foreign governments to accede to the
United States anti-cartel philosophy and to comply with the terms of commodity agree-
ments negotiated by the United States. See Note, supra note 13, at 768-70.
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assuages Australian remonstrations concerning the private treble
damage remedy in United States antitrust law. The prospect of an-
titrust conflict prevention is strengthened since the agreement es-
tablishes a meaningful and viable flow of information between the
two countries by securing the confidentiality of such information.
The application of Australian blocking legislation will no longer
thwart antitrust cooperation because the agreement provisions
largely eliminate the raison d'etre of such defensive legislation. To
view the Australian agreement as a panacea which completely
eradicates antitrust strife between the United States and Australia
would be naive. Transnational regulation of domestic economies
simply cannot be tailored to fully accomodate foreign national sov-
ereignty in a single bilateral agreement. The United States-Austra-
lia antitrust agreement can be viewed realistically, however, as an
initial bilateral undertaking which identifies and confronts the pri-
mary obstacles to effective antitrust harmony between the United
States and Australia.
James W. King
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